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SAFETY ASPECTS OF AN INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION REACTOR 
Summary 
Releases into the environment of radioactive materials contained in 
heavy ion fusion (HIF) reactor plants must be prevented by similar 
safety design concepts as they are applied to present fission convert-
er (e.g. LWR's) and breeder reactors (LMFBR's). This study is 
intended to identify significant safety aspects of inertial confine-
ment fusion power plant concepts and to relate them to the more 
familiar basis of knowledge about the safety and the hazards of other 
advanced nuclear power reactor systems such as the LMFBR. Needs for 
safety related research and development specifically for inertial con-
finement fusionwill be pointed out. 
SICHERHEITSASPEKTE VON TRAEGHEITSFUSIONSREAKTOREN 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Freisetzung radioaktiver Stoffe aus Trägheitsfusionsreaktoren muß 
durch ähnliche Sicherheitskonzepte unterbunden werden wie bei heutigen 
Spaltungsreaktoren (Leichtwasser-Reaktoren und Brutreaktoren). Diese 
Studie soll wesentliche Sicherheitsaspekte von Reaktoranlagen auf 
Trägheitsfusionsbasis identifizieren und sie zu der vertrauteren Wis-
sensbasis in Beziehung setzen, die hinsichtlich Sicherheit und 
Gefährdungspotential anderer fortschrittlicher Leistungsreaktorsysteme 
(wie Schneller Brutreaktoren) bereits besteht. Erfordernisse für 
speziell auf Trägheitsfusion ausgerichtete Forschungs- und Entwick-
lungsarbeiten werden aufgezeigt. 
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SAFETY ASPECTS OF AN INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION REACTOR 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Releases into the environment of radioactive materials contained in 
heavy ion fusion (HIF) reactor plants must be prevented by similar 
safety design concepts as they are applied to present fission convert-
er (e.g. LWR's) and breeder reactors (LMFBR's). The safety concept of 
these present commercial fission reactors can be described by the "de-
fense in depth concept" with protection systems for accident pre-
vention and multiple containment barriers between the radioactive 
materials and the environment. Present safety regulations 
criteria for nuclear power plants will certainly also 
applied to future commercial size fusionpower reactors. 
Radioactive materials contained in a HIF reactor plant are: 
o tritium in the fuel cycle of the plant, 
and siting 
have to be 
o activated debris material from burning pellets within the reactor 
cavity, 
o activated structural and shielding material of the reactor, 
o activated coolant in the coolant circuits, 
o activated structural material in the beam channels and the shield-
ing of the focussing magnets. 
GOALS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
This study is intended to identify significant safety aspects of iner-
tial confinement fusion power plant concepts and to relate them to the 
more familiar basis of knowledge about the safety and the hazards of 
other advanced nuclear power reactor systems such as the LMFBR. 
The HIBALL design study will be used as a reference for an inertial 
confinement system [1, 2]. The results of INTOR, Phase One [3), are 
used for the comparison with magnetic confinement fusion. 
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In many respects, a safety and hazards analysis of inertial confine-
ment fusion can only be very preliminary, as the necessary level of 
design detailing is by far not yet achieved. Hence, the study will 
concentrate more on inherent features and on the potential sources of 
hazards (radioactive and toxic materials, potential sources of 
destructive energy releases) than on sequences of events (failures and 
protective measures) which might lead to release of hazardous material 
to the environment. A primary goal of this study is to indicate crit-
ical areas where safety related research and development will be 
required specifically for inertial confinement fusion, while in other 
areas inertial confinement fusion can benefit from the existing and 
still developing base of knowledge of LMFBRs and magnetic confinement 
fusion reactors. 
HIBALL PLANT DESCRIPTION 
The !!eavy Ion Beam Inertial Confinement Fusion Reactor Study "HIBALL" 
assumes four reactor chambers with a gross thermal power of 10.2 GW 
and a net electric power of 3.8 GW (see Figure 1). The reactor cham-
bers are each driven at 5 Hz by pellet explosions initiated by 10 GeV 
209Bi+ ion beams. The beams themselves are generated by a linear 
accelerator of 3 km length and a number of compressor and storage 
rings. 
The high electrical power is typical for heavy ion beam Inertial 
Confinement Fusion (ICF) reactors, since the pulse energy of about 
5 MJ required to ignite a pellet by inertial confinement can only be 
generated by big accelerator systems which have inherently high repe-
tition rates of 20-30 Hz. As the reactor chambers are operated at 
5Hz, four to six such chambers can be driven by a single accelerator 
system. Twenty beam channels guide 2.5 kA ion beams of 20 ns duration 
into the reactor chamber. All 20 beams are focussed by strong magnets 
at the reactor chamber entrance onto a spot size of about 7 mm diam-
eter. The fuel pellets are injected at 5 Hz frequency with a velocity 
of 200 m/s from the top of the reactor chamber. They are hit by the 
beams when they reach the center of the chamber. The pellets are 
spherical and consist of several layers of different materials. The 
f-rj 
f-'· 
OQ 
.:: 
Ii 
(1) 
f-' 
'"0 ::X:: 
1-' H 
P> l:l:l 
~ 0> 
rl- t-< 
t-< 
1-' 
P> Ii 
~ (1) 
0 P> 
t:! () 
rl- rl-
0 • Ii 
P> • 
Ii 
Ii 
P> 
~ 
OQ 
(1) (.>) 
8 
(1) 
~ 
rl-
.. 
HIBAll FUSION REACTOR PLANT (3.8 GWel) 
tZl 
() 
::r 
(1) 
8 
P> 
rl-
..... 
() 
0 
1-h 
rl-
::r 
(1) 
Ii 
(1) 
P> 
() 
rl-
1 Ion Sources and RFQ Linacs 6 2x5 Storage Rings 
0 
Ii 2 Funneling Section 7 4x5 Induction Linac Compressors 
3 Alvarez Linac 8 Reactor Chamber 
4 ~['ransfer Ring 9 Target Factory 
5 5 Condenser Rings 1 0 Control Building 
- 4 -
5 
12 
11 
6 
10 
7 
- -
Fig. 2: HIBALL Reactor Chamber with Focussing Magnets 
1 Lateral INPORT Blanket 7 Coolant Exit 
2 Top INPORT Blanket 8 Vacuum Pumps 
3 Bottom Pool 9 Steel Reflector 
4 Beam Ports 1 0 Concrete Shield 
5 Pellet Injector 1 1 Rotatable Top Concrete Shield 
6 Coolant Intake 12 Removable Plug 
Figure 2. HIBALL reactor chamber: Cross-section of the layout 
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innermost layer is cryogenic (4 K) D-T-fuel, followed by a pusher 
ablator and a tamper shell of Pb83Li 17 and lead. The outer diameter of 
a pellet is 7.3 mm and roughly matches the focus size of the overlap-
ping ion beams. The pellets for HIBALL will have to be mass produced 
at a rate of at least 20 per second. Some details on pellet manufac-
turing can be found in [4]. 
Figure 2 shows a schematic view of a reactor chamber which has a 
diameter of 14 m and a height of 12 m. The chamber tank is surrounded 
by a 40 cm thick lead-lithium cooled steel reflector and 350 cm of 
water cooled concrete. On the inner surface, the steel tank is pro-
tected by the coolant breeder (Pb83Li 17 ) streaming through hollow 
plate structures and pipes braided of SiC fiber. These so-called 
INPORT tubes [5] allow the bulk of the coolant to flow from the top to 
the bottom of the reactor cavity in a controlled way (Figure 3). At 
the same time, some of the coolant will penetrate and wet the outer 
surface of the tubes. The thickness of the liquid film on the outer 
tube surface is sufficient to absorb the X-rays and the debris from 
the exploding target, thus effectively protecting the structural com-
ponents. The 10m long INPORT tubes are arranged in two tube banks. 
The inner bank contains 3 cm diameter tubes in a tight arrangement to 
remove the high heat flux caused by X-rays and ion debris (175 W/cm2). 
The second tube bank is made up of 10 cm diameter tubes and will 
remove most of the kinetic energy of the neutrons and provide the tri-
tium breeding. The thick region of both tube banks reduces the 
displacement darnage caused by the neutrons in the steel wall of the 
reactor chamber. 
The reactor chamber is held at 10-4 Torr vacuum in order to lower the 
interaction of the Bi+ ions with the atmosphere of the reactor chamber 
and to allow the tritium diffusion out of the coolant. Vacuum pumps 
are provided to reduce the chamber pressure between target explosions 
-4 below 10 Torr. 
The innermost INPORT tubes will withstand the radiation load for about 
two years. For their replacement the vessel cover can be rotated. It 
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contains a removable plug through which both the ceiling structure and 
the wall elements can be removed and replaced individually. 
The final focussing magnets have to withstand the radiation darnage and 
nuclear heating caused by fast neutrons. The magnet design in HIBALL 
uses either normal or superconducting magnets. Normal conducting coils 
can be used close to the beam pipe and to the reactor, whereas the 
power saving superconducting coils are arranged in better protected 
locations. 
The coolant is heated from 330 to 500°C in the reactor chamber. Four 
primary pumps take the hot coolant from the lower pool within the 
BULK OF 
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SEEPAGE 
Figure 3. Concept of INPORT Tubes 
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Fig. 4: HIBALL Reactor Building (940 MWel) and Beam Lines 
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reactor chamber and push it through four intermediate heat exchangers 
(IHX) and back to the upper inlet ports of the reactor chamber. In the 
IHX the coolant (Pb83Li 17 ) transfers its heat to a secondary sodium 
circuit with four secondary sodium pumps and four sodium heated H20 
steam generators and superheaters (Figure 4). The steam drives a tur-
bine/generator system. The overall thermal efficiency is about 41%. 
The beam lines, the primary and secondary coolant circuits are 
arranged in steel clad concrete walls. To avoid coolant/air reactions 
in case of leaks in pipes or other circuit components, these concrete 
cells can be filled with nitrogen. The whole reactor chamber is sur-
rounded by a double containment with a low leak rate to minimize tri-
tium releases into the environment. 
The pellet factory contains the storage facilities for deuterium and 
tritium containers, the manufacturing line for the pellets, a tritium 
and deuterium filling station and a storage facility for the cryogenic 
DT pellets. Transport channels from the pellet factory lead to ~ach 
reactor chamber. The pellets must be cooled up to the time when they 
are injected into the reactor chamber. 
The pellet injector is a pneumatic gun using deuterium as a propelling 
gas. Electromagnetic accelerators are a possible alternative to this. 
During the acceleration process in the injector the pellet must be 
protected by a sabot from which it must be detached upon leaving the 
injector. Synchronisation of the pellet during its flight to the cen-
ter and the accelerator beams is achieved by a laser light pellet 
tracking system which supplies the necessary signal to the driver 
rings releasing the ion beams [1, 2, 6]. 
RADIOACTIVE INVENTORIES OF HIF PO\vER PLANTS 
Before one can adress the nuclear environmental and safety issues of 
any fission or fusion power plant one must list its inventory of 
radioactive material. Upon this basis, one can discuss the arnount of 
radioactivity which might be released into the environment. Finally, 
one can determine the potential radiation exposure of the population 
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in the immediate vicinity and at greater distance from the plant under 
normal operation and accident conditions. 
Radioactive materials as they exist or are generated in different 
parts of the inertial confinement fusion reactor plant are: 
o tritium in the whole fuel cycle of the plant (target fabrication 
facility, breeding blanket, reactor cavity, vacuum pumps, clean-up 
and isotope separation systems), 
o activated debris material from burned pellets within the reactor 
cavity and in the vacuum system, 
o activated structural and shielding material araund the reactor 
cavity (blanket, reflector, radiation shield), 
o coolant that is itself activated or contaminated with activated 
corrosion products, 
o activated structural and shielding material in the beam channels 
and at the focussing magnets, 
o activated and contaminated material which is being handled during 
maintenance, repair, and decommissioning. 
In the following paragraphs the quantities of the different radioac-
tive materials will be discussed. For tritium, we assume a closed 
cycle with constant inventory. For the other species, activities at 
shut-down after two years of full-power operation are given. At that 
time, the more important nuclides will have saturated and radioactivi-
ty build-up will continue at a slower rate. 
TRITIUM INVENTORY 
Within the reactor cavities of a HIF power plant the thermal power is 
generated by igniting and burning multilayer spherical targets con-
taining about 4 mg of D-T. The shot frequency of a reactor cavity will 
be about 5 Hz for technical constraints explained in [1, 2). At this 
frequency, one cavity is assumed to produce 1 GW of electrical power. 
This leads to a required tritium supply of about 1 kg/d in one reactor 
or about 4.1 kg/(GW d) forapower plant like HIBALL consisting of 4 
e 
reactors (1 kg of tritium has an activity of 0.96.10 7 Ci). Only a 
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fraction of about 30% or 0.3 kg/(GW d) of the tritium can be burned 
e 
during the fusion process within the pellet. Thus, about 0.7 kg/(GW d) 
e 
of unburned tritium must be handled by the exhaust and vacuum pump 
systems of each reactor cavity tagether with about 0.87 kg/(GW d) 
e 
which will be continuously bred in the blankets (breeding ratio of 
1.25). The solubility of tritium in the coolant and breedermaterial 
determines how much of it will remain in the cavity atmosphere and how 
much will enter the coolant. Due to the low solubility of tritium and 
deuterium in Pb83ti 17 used as liquid breeder material and coolant at 
0 -4 
operating temperatures of 330-500 and at 10 Torr vacuum conditions 
in the reactor cavity, most of the tritium generated by breeding will 
enter the cavity atmosphere. From there, it will flow to the exhaust 
processing system through large 
reactor cavity tagether with the 
duced by fusion, 6He from the 
openings in the upper part of 
remairring deuterium, the 4He 
6
ti(n,p) reaction, and some 
the 
pro-
ather 
impurities. The reactor cavity exhaust is pumped by compound cryopumps 
with an on-line time of about 2 hours and a tritium inventory of about 
0.1 kg/GW . The compound cryopumps are regenerated so that helium is 
e 
released first. Then, deuterium and tritium are released and sent to 
a clean-up unit where impurities are removed. The clean-up unit has a 
tritium inventory of only about 10 g/GW . The remairring deuterium and 
e 
tritium is collected from all four reactor cavities and is finally 
separated in a cryogenic distillation unit (0.08 kg T inventory) to 
form a purified D-T stream for target manufacturing and a pure D2 
stream for the target injection systern. 
The arnount of tritiurn to be stored in the target rnanufacturing station 
depends essentially upon the target manufacturing process and upon 
whether the filling of the targets will have to be clone batchwise or 
in a continuous process. The nurnber of targets tobe produced will be 
about 3.2*105 targets/(GW d). For the HIBALL plant with 4 cavities, 
e 
this amounts to 1.3 x 106 per day (5.18 kg T). If the D-T fuel has to 
be filled into the targets by diffusion through the outer shells, the 
fill time will depend on the perrneation rate of D-T through the lead 
and lithium-lead shells at sufficiently high ternperatures. This rnay 
require up to several days and a coresponding D-T inventory within the 
target fabrication plant will be necessary. A continuous fill and fab-
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rication process would require smaller D-T inventories. In this 
process, cryogenic spherical targets would be transported past sput-
tering guns which apply the consecutive spherical layers onto the 
spheres. At the same time they are cooled by a cold Helium gas jet 
[ 6] . 
TABLE 1: TRITIUM INVENTORY PER GW a) 
e 
+------------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 
Plant contributor Tritium 
component inventory 
kg/GW 
e 
+------------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 
Blanket Li 17Pb83 (coolant and 
breeder material 
Coolant guide tubes (SiC) 
in blanket section 
0.004 
0.003-0.2551 
+------------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 
Primary 
coolant 
circuits 
0.119 
+------------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 
Tritium 
cycle 
Cryopumps 
Clean-up unit 
Isotope Separation 
0.1 
0.01 
0.02 
+------------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 
Target 
fabricationl Targets (one full-power day supply) 
Storage in uranium beds 
T t . f b . . b) arge s 1n a r1cat1on 
1 
1 
1 to 3 
+------------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 
a) 1 kg corresponds to an activity of 0. 96~qo 7 Ci 
b) depending an target filling process 
Table 1 summarizes the tritium inventories within a HIF reactor plant 
like HIBALL. By far the highest tritium inventory will occur in the 
target fabrication facility, where a one day supply of cryogenic tar-
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gets to fuel the reactor cavities and a oneday tritium supply in ura-
nium beds (prior to target filling) have been assumed. 
The tritium inventory within the liquid blanket and breeder material 
Pb83Li 17 will be relatively small (see Table 1). Due to the low solu-
bility of only 7~'qo - 2 wppm T in the coolant the tritium inventory 
amounts only to about 4 g/GW or 4*104Ci/GW . A similar inventory of 
e e 
3 g/GW was assumed for the coolant guide structures (INPORT units) in 
e 
the HIBALL study [2]. However, more recent estimates uneavered larger 
uncertainties of the tritium solubility in the SiC material of the 
INPORT structures. These estimates extend to as much as 255 g/GW [7]. 
e 
The tritium inventory in the primary coolant circuits is estimated 
here to be 119 g/GW . 
e 
OTHER RADIOACTIVE INVENTORIES OF THE REACTOR CAVITY 
Neutron induced activation of Pb83Li 17 leads the radioactivity inven-
tories as shown by Table 2. 
TABLE 2: RADIOACTIVITY INVENTORY IN A REACTOR CAVITY 
DUE TO NEUTRON ACTIVATION OF PB 
+---------+---------~-------+----------------+ 
Isotope Activity 
(Ci/GW ) 
e 
Half life 
+---------+-----------------+----------------+ 
203Hg 1.2*106 47 d 
205Hg 1.1*106 5.2 min 
204Tl 0.4*105 3.78 y 
203Pb 0.6*108 52 h 
205 Pb 0.5*102 15 000 000 y 
210Pba) 1.6*102 138 d 
+---------+-----------------+----------------+ 
I Total 6.2*10 7 
+---------+-----------------+----------------+ 
a) from 40 atom-ppm Bi impurity 
- 13 -
The highest activity with 0.6*108 Ci/GW is represented by 203Pb which 
e 
has a half life of 52 h. Bismuth, a common natural impurity in lead, 
would be activated to 210Po. In addition, radioactive corrosion pro-
ducts would have tobe taken into account as radioactive materials. 
No data are presently available for these. In HIBALL, there is addi-
tional bismuth brought in by the ion beams; this amounts, however, to 
only 1 ppm in 30 full-power years assuming that it accumulates in the 
coolant [ 1, 2]. 
In addition, 6He and 8Li are produced from lithium. They contribute to 
the radioactive inventory of the operating plant but not to the 
release hazard because of their short half-lives of less than a second 
[ 1' 2] . 
RADIOACTIVITY FRm1 THE BURNING PELLET 
The HIBALL pellet contains, besides D-T, only materials that are also 
present in the coolant (Li and Pb) and thus produces the same radioac-
tive nuclides. Quantitatively, the pellet radioactivity adds a negli-
gible amount to the coolant radioactivity. 
RADIOACTIVITY AND AFTERHEAT IN THE REACTOR 
Radioactivity will be induced by neutron capture in the structural 
material of the blanket, the first steel wall, the reflector, and 
shielding of the reactor. Calculations show that the buildup of radio-
activity due to the short living isotopes will saturate after about 
2 years operation. The total activity per unit of thermal power 
(Ci/Watt) for the whole reactor chamber (blanket, first wall and 
reflector) is shown in Figure 4. 
was estimated to be 0.6 Ci/Watt 
The radioactivity level at shutdown 
or 1.5~.,10 9 Ci/GW . The bulk of this 
e 
activity is due to neutron activation of steel structures. It 
decreases relatively slowly requiring about three weeks to be reduced 
by a factor of 10, and two years to be reduced by a factor of 100. 
The heat power generated by the decay of radioactive isotopes imme-
diately after reactor shutdown is 0. 66~~ of the reactor power or 
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16.7 MWth per reactor cavity. This requires a separate residual heat 
removal system. The afterheat decreases faster than the radioactivity 
[ 6] . 
The radioactivity in the shield is significantly lower than the radio-
activity in the reflector. However, its value of 6.3*10- 3Ci/Wattth or 
1. 6~'<'10 7 Ci/GW is still significant. The afterheat at shutdown is 
e 
0.077 % of the operatingpower which corresponds to 1.9 MWth per reac-
tor chamber. Although this is relatively small it still will require 
a certain residual heat removal capacity [1, 2]. 
RADIOACTIVITY OF THE BEAH LINES 
Neutrons from the burning pellet will stream through the beam ports up 
the beam lines and activate steel structures and shields there. The 
HIBALL-II final focussing layout [6] with its smaller beam ports and a 
final neutron dump about 40 m from the chamber wall constitutes an 
important enhancement over the original HIBALL design [1, 2], also 
with respect to activation. The activity per beam line was estimated 
at 66 Ci (corresponding to 1.4*103 Ci/GW ) for the new design. While 
e 
this activity level is low compared to the one in the vicinity of the 
reactor cavity, it is still high enough to produce an unacceptable 
biological dose level [6, 8]. 
THE IHPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE HATERIALS 
The confinement of tritium within the reactor plant is one of the most 
difficult technical problems of HIF. Tritium permeates relatively eas-
ily through steel walls to the environment. Fortunately, the high 
inventory of about 12 kg T in the target factory of the HIBALL plant 
will be stored either at cryogenic temperatures within the pellets or 
safely absorbed in uranium beds. Only about 0. 5 kg or s~·qo 6 Ci are in 
the coolant circuits or in the fuel cycle from where a fraction can 
permeate to the environment. Special design measures must be taken to 
prevent excessive tritium releases. 
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The 203Pb activity of 2. 4~"'10 8Ci in the coolant of the whole HIBALL 
plant must be taken into consideration primarily in the accident anal-
ysis. A certain percentage of this radioactivity could reach the envi-
ronment as aerosols. I~ can hardly be envisioned how majorportians of 
the radioactivity accumulated in the blanket structures, the first 
wall, and the reflector structures could be released into the environ-
ment even in an accident. However, this radioactivity level will be 
important for considerations an remote handling and maintenance oper-
ations of blanket sections and for waste disposal questions. 
TRITIUM RELEASE UNDER NORMAL OPERATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The permeation of tritium through the walls of steam generators and 
through components of the D-T fuel cycle represents the most important 
6 problern in the environmental safety of HIF-reactor plants. Gaseaus He 
has such a short half life that it does not play a role for radio-
activity release in normal operation. All other radioactive materials 
(besides T) exist in either liquid or solid form within the plant and, 
hence, are not readily available for release. Tritium may be released 
as either T2 or HT to the atmosphere or as HTO into rivers and lakes. 
Gaseaus tritium is very soon oxidized into T2 or HTO. Ultimately, any 
tritium escaping or released in a controlled manner will thus be pres-
ent as tritiated water. Plants and animals then may contain HTO/H20 
ratios close to those existing in their environment. Radioactive expo-
sure can occur from the ingestion of food or drinking water. Moreover, 
tritiated water can be absorbed by inhalation and through the skin of 
the human body. In this way, the ß-radiation (maximum energy 18 keV) 
of tritium causes a whole-body exposure. 
PER~IEABILITY OF TRITIUM INTO THE STEAM CYCLE 
The permeation of tritium from the Pb83Li 17 through the walls of the 
steam generators raises a difficult technical problem, as the permea-
bility of tritium through steel and the heat transfer areas of steam 
generators are large enough so that considerable quantities of tritium 
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can reach the steam cycle and the environment. If one assumes tritium 
permeabilities as given in the literature [ 1' 2, 9 '10] and a heat 
transfer area of about 104 m2 for a HIF reactor plant like HIBALL, one 
obtains a leakage rate of about 105 Ci/ (GW d). This is by a factor of 
e 
3 
about 10 higher than can be allowed. Therefore, a diffusion barrier 
of about 103 to 104 for tritium is needed, which can only be achieved 
by either double walled stem generators as they are developed present-
ly for LMFBR applications or by an intermediate liquid rnetal circuit 
as presently applied in LHFBR's. 
nouble walled stearn generators would have two tubes in close contact 
(Duplex tube design). On the inner side of these Duplex tubes, water 
or stearn flows at high pressures (16 HPa), whereas on the outer side 
the Pb83Li17 coolant would flow across the bundles. A heliurn purge 
strearn with some oxygen would pass along slots between the two tubes 
and 
o provide an oxidizing atmosphere between the two tubes, 
o carry tritium away which is perrneating from the Pb83Li 17 side into 
the space between the two tubes. 
The oxide films formed between the two tubes and the oxide film on the 
water steam side would provide an additional effective diffusion bar-
rier. The outer shells of the steam generators would also have to be 
double walled with a helium gas space satisfying sirnilar conditions as 
in the Duplex tubes. Estimates summarized in the HIBALL study [2, 6] 
have shown that this diffusion barrier concept could be sufficient to 
keep the permeation of tritium into the steam cycle below about 
5 Ci/(GW d}. However, experimental results would be needed to prove 
e 
this concept. 
If an intermediate liquid-metal loop according to standard LMFBR tech-
nique is employed instead of the Duplex steam generator, diffusion 
barriers of a quality of 103 are required to prevent excessive leakage 
of tritium into the intermediate circuit. A more recent design study 
[7] showed that eight intermediate heat exchangers and 24 sodiumjwater 
steam generators would be needed for HIBALL. The total losses of tri-
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tium from the intermediate circuits (with sodium as intermediate 
coolant) would then only be about 2 Ci/d. Only about 1 Ci/d would be 
released through the steam generator tubes into the water. The tritium 
inventory of the intermediate coolant loops would be less than 1 g 
[ 7]. 
The primary coolant circuits consisting of pumps, valves, pipings, 
flow meters, storage or hold-up tanks, purification systems etc. will 
have to be designed with aluminium sleeves to provide a secondary con-
tainment barrier against tritium permeation. Pumps, valves or similar 
components where leakages may occur will need additional jacketing or 
glove boxes to keep tritium leakages low. 
Tritium leakages from the cryopump, clean-up and isotope separation 
systems are difficult to estimate. If one uses similar release rates 
as estimated for the Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA) at Oak Ridge 
[11] and if one applies an adequate scaling up to apower plant like 
HIBALL, one obtains tritium release rates of 5 Ci/(GW d) [1, 2]. 
e 
The chamber shielding and other auxiliary components will be water 
cooled. Small amounts of tritium will be generated there by neutron 
activation of deuterium or by tritium permeation from the blankets. 
Tritium lasses from these systems are in the range of 1 Ci/(GW d). 
e 
The buildings in which tritium is handled will be equipped with a tri-
tium recovery unit. In this unit, the tritiumwill be catalytically 
oxidized and then be absorbed on molecular sieves. Tritium lasses due 
to building leakage are, therefore, expected to be small and in the 
range of 2 Ci/(GW d). As was discussed in "Tritium inventory" on page 
e 
9, the target factory will contain the largest portion of the tritium 
inventory. Most of this inventory will either be needed in the target 
filling process or be stored in uranium bed containers and in newly 
fabricated targets. The tritium leak rate from the target factory is 
difficult to estimate as no operating target factory exists. A loss 
rate of about 5 Ci/(GW d) of tritium from the target factory appears 
e 
to be permissible. Table 3 summarizes the tritium lasses from a HIF 
reactor plant like HIBALL. The total lasses are estimated to be 
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22 (GW d). Of these total lasses, 80% are expected to go into the 
e 
atmosphere and 20 % into water. 
TABLE 3: TRITIUM RELEASED FROM A HIF PLANT 
Electrical power: 3.8 GW 
e 
+-----------------------------------------------+-----------+ 
I Ci/(GW d) I 
e 
+-----------------------------------------------+-----------+ 
Intermediate coolant circuit (sodium) 
Double walled steam generators 
Water coolant circuits of shield 
Cryopump system 
Fuel clean-up unit 
Isotope separation unit 
Target Factory 
Buildings and tritium recovery system 
3 
5 
1 
3 
2 
1 
5 
2 
+-----------------------------------------------+-----------+ 
I Total release 1 22 
+-----------------------------------------------+-----------+ 
TOXIC MATERIALS 
In addition to the radioactive materials, there are also some toxic 
materials used in inertial confinement fusion reactor design. Such 
toxic materials are, e.g., mercury used in the vacuum pumps or the 
lead used as coolant (Pb83Li 17 ) and as neutron multiplier. Although 
the potential hazards from these materials are by far smaller than 
those of radioactive materials, they will have to be considered. 
ENERGY SOURCES 
A significant difference between inertial confinement fusion reactors 
on one side and magnetic confinement fusion reactors as well as LMFBRs 
on the other is the energy which is stored within the central part of 
the plant and which is conceivably available for conversion into 
mechanical energy on short time scale to cause damage. In magnetic 
confinement fusion reactors, it is the internal energy of the plasma 
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and the magnetic energy whose release within a few milliseconds is 
considered in disruption analysis. In I}ITBRs, it is the thermal energy 
in tons of fuel which can potentially vaporize large quantities of the 
coolant up to high pressures if efficient mixing processes are 
assumed. Such energy resources are not available in inertial confine-
ment fusion reactors. 
CHEMICAL ENERGY AVAILABLE IN DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM 
As shown in Table 4, the HIBALL plant (with 3.8 GW ) contains approxi-
e 
mately 22 kg of deuterium and tritium in the target fabrication area. 
Total burn of this amount of hydrogen would produce about 1200-1400 MJ 
of energy However, the concern about hydrogen is not the total energy 
in a steady burn but rather the explosion potential. Hydrogen explo-
sions are possible at concentrations above 4.1% in hydrogen-air mix-
tures. Techniques like compartment limitations, inert atmosphere and 
oxidization promoters (recombination) are well-established for mini-
mizing if not eliminating the likelihood of explosions. As a 
reference, we note that after a meltdown of a water cooled fission 
power reactor about 1200 kg of hydrogen may be generated [12]. 
TABLE 4: TRITIUM AND DEUTERIUM INVENTORIES 
+-------------------------+---------+-----------+ 
component tritium deuterium 
kg/GW 
e 
+-------------------------+---------+-----------+ 
Blanket 
Tritium cycle 
Target fabrication 
Targets in fabrication 
0.007 
0.13 
2 
1-3 
0.005 
0.091 
1.4 
0.7-2 
+-------------------------+---------+-----------+ 
HEAT ENERGY IN THE FIRST WALL AND THE COOLANT SYSTEM 
The Li-Pb in the first wall and the primary coolant system is a poten-
tial source for energy release in two respects: 
- 20 -
o chemical reactions with air, water and concrete are possible, 
o intimate mixing with water may generate high pressures due to rap-
id steam generation. 
It is considered to be one of the great advantages of Pb83Li 17 over 
other liquid metals that it is chemically much less aggressive, e.g., 
than sodium or lithium [13]. Thermal reactions with water, however, 
are a point of major concern in just the srune way as for LMFBRs or MCF 
reactors. The principal technique to avoid the potential of large sca-
le thermal reactions between Li-Pb and water is the provision of two 
walls between the two liquids. The double wall steam generator 
accounts for this requirement in the coolant cycle. However, the pos-
sibility of contact between the liquid metal coolant Pb83Li 17 and the 
cooling water needs further consideration and research. 
CONTAINMENT PHILOSOPHY AND REQUIREMENTS 
The general safety philosophy applied to nuclear reactor design is to 
protect the environment from the radioactivity contained within the 
reactor chamber by several leak-tight barriers. In case of HIBALL, 
each reactor chamber produces a power of 
radioactivity inventory of 
about 1 GW and contains a 
e 
about 10 7 Ci Tritium, 
about 6*10 7 Ci in the coolant, 
about 1.5*109 Ci in structural· material. 
Although this is almost an order of magnitude less than the radioac-
tive inventory of comparable converter reactors (LWR's) or breeder 
reactors (LMFBR' s) [ 14, 15], it does not principally alleviate the 
requirements to be imposed on containment design. As the tritium 
inventory is by almost three orders of magnitude higher in fusion 
reactors, e.g., Tokamaks or ICF reactors as HIBALL, compared with fis-
sion converter and breeder reactors, this even increases the 
requirements for leak-tightness of the containrnent barrier. 
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The reactor chambers as well as the primary and the intermediate coo-
lant circuits, must therefore be surrounded by an inner concrete Con-
tainment, divided into steel lined cells each containing one of the 
three or four coolant circuits. Steel lining of the concrete cells is 
necessary to achieve the required high leak-tightness and to prevent 
reactions between the liquid metal coolant and the concrete in the 
case of leaks in pipings or valves. In addition, these inner concrete 
cells must be mainly filled with an inert atmosphere, e.g., 99% nitro-
gen and e~ oxygen in order to prevent PbLi fires or sodium fires 
(intermediate coolant circuits). 
This inner containment must be surrounded by an outer containment 
which may be air filled but has to be designed to guarantee high 
leak-tightness, typically 0.25 volume%/day leak-rate as is the present 
standard technical requirement for 1\VR' s [ 16]. The outer containment 
must be kept at a somewhat lower pressure against the environment so 
that air can only leak from the outside into the containment. The 
exhaust air of the outer containment is carried via filter systems 
into a stack and to the environment. Filter systems become necessary 
to retain aerosols which could develop in the case of chemical 
reactions of the liquid metal coolant (PbLi or sodium) with the oxygen 
in the containments. 
The outer containment must also be equipped with a tritium removal 
system which consists of several catalytic recombiners, where tritium 
contained in the air is recombined with oxygen. The resulting T20 can 
be extracted after cooling down in a heat exchanger, while cooler air 
is returned to the containment. Figure 4 shows the main components 
of such a containment system. 
INTERNAL HISSILE PROTECTION 
Missiles may be generated in a plant if energy can be converted rapid-
ly into mechanical work. High pressure systems, such as pressurized 
water systems, provide this potential. The same applies to systems 
with high magnetic energy content or with two fluids (e.g., Pb83Li 17 
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and water) which operate at significantly different temperatures in 
close neighborhood to each other. 
With respect to the energy storage, inertial confinement fusion reac-
tors differ considerably from both magnetic confinement reactors as 
well as LMFBRs. In fusion reactors based on magnetic confinement such 
as INTOR, the superconducting magnets represent a possible safety haz-
ard in as much as the release of their stored energy (about 6 GJ per 
magnet) could conceivably serve as the initiating energy of an acci-
dent sequence that would release toxic or radioactive materials. In 
L~WBRs, it is the high temperature thermal energy of the fuel, which 
(in close neighbourhood to the liquid sodium coolant) represents a 
potential source for destructive mechanical work. 
In a HIBALL type reactor, energy 
less important than in a TOKAMAK 
stored in magnets is significantly 
for instance. Near the reactor the 
beam focussing magnets can be of the normal conducting type (copper 
coils) and da not represent a major hazard potential for the reactor 
chamber. 
Aceidental hazards of superconducting magnets were extensively ana-
lysed [17]. According to this safety analysis, severe darnage is only 
caused if a single-conductor failure within the winding would propa-
gate to adjacent conductors. This can lead 
destroy the magnet. If the entire winding 
to a current arc which can 
and casing would rupture 
simultaneously at two different locations, the broken and loose sec-
tion would become a missile accelerated by Lorentz forces [17). 
Another issue is the energy stored in the magnet system of the accel-
erator, the storage rings and the beam channels. Consideration must 
be given to methods of localized uncontrolled release of this energy. 
However, because of the great distance from the reactors to the bulk 
of the driver system, failure of the driver system walls is of negli-
gible importance with respect to activity release. 
The other mechanism, which is generally considered as a potential 
source for missile generation, involves rapid conversion of thermal 
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energy into mechanical work via mixing two liquids of significantly 
different temperatures. A requirement for work production is that the 
initially cold liquid should have a relatively low boiling point. In 
HIBALL, the water used for shield cooling may represent the cold liq-
uid while the Pb83Li 17 - or even some malten structural material pro-
duced in preceding sequences of accidental events - may be regarded as 
the hot liquid. 
EXTERNAL MISSILE PROTECTION 
External missiles may be generated from aircraft crashes, chemical 
explosions at or near the reactor site, or may result from other 
mechanically accelerated objects. Containment building design to acco-
modate such loadings and to avoid penetration of the containment bar-
rier is standard practice for all nuclear reactors. HIBALL does not 
present any particular problems in this respect. 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods and extreme wind loads, 
need similar consideration and analysis for inertial confinement 
fusion reactors as for other fusion and fission reactors. A safe 
shut-down of the plant and a reliable functioning of all afterheat 
removal systems must be guaranteed. One area in operational safety 
and reliability of the plant possibly requiring special treatment is 
the driver system. Because of its large spatial dimensions, preventive 
measures agairrst flooding with water and the guarantee of proper 
geometrical alignment after earthquake loading will have to be inves-
tigated in more detail. 
EVENTS CAUSED BY HUMAN INTERVENTION 
Intentional human intervention as a cause of darnage to the plant and 
as a potential danger to the containment system integrity is also a 
general concern for all kinds of nuclear reactors. The only reason why 
HIBALL may be considered more sensitive to such events is due to the 
larger site which includes the target manufacturing facility and the 
- 24 -
whole driver system. However, with adequate security measures taken, 
there is no indication of an increased hazard potential as compared to 
other reactor types. 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
A first step in the assessment of safety and environmental effects for 
fusion power reactors is the identification of potential sources of 
hazard to the public's health and safety. Preliminary results of an 
attempt to identify hazardous materials for fusion reactor plant 
designs operating on the deuterium-tritiurn (D-T) fuel cycle are surnrna-
rized in Table 5. 
TABLE 5: LIST OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
+----------------------++--------------------------+ 
I Radioactive Materials! I Toxic Materials 
+----------------------++--------------------------+ 
Tritium II Beryllium 
II 
Radioactive II Chromiurn (in 
Coolant II structural components) 
II 
Radioactive II Lead (coolant) 
corrosion II 
products II Mercury (cryopurnps) 
II 
Radioactive II 
structural II 
materials II 
+----------------------++--------------------------+ 
This listing 1s partly based on the analysis of TOK~M~-K type fusion 
reactor plants [18] and takes also into account the sornewhat different 
situation in inertial confinement fusion reactors. The 
non-radiological hazards (toxic materials release) appear to require 
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some consideration because of the relatively large quantities in use 
or in inventory at the fusion power reactor site. 
In addition to identification of these materials, there is the ques-
tion of the source of that hazard; i.e. how is it released and/or made 
mobile if originally in solid form. There are several ways of iden-
tification of these sources. A preliminary listing is given in 
Table 6. 
TABLE 6: SOURCES OF HAZARD FOR MCF AND ICF PLANTS 
+--------------------------------+------------------------------------+ 
I Material Potential source of hazard 
+--------------------------------+------------------------------------+ 
Hydrogen isotopes 
Radioactive corrosion 
products 
Radioactive structural 
material (first wall) 
Lithium, Pb83Li 17 
Mercury 
Beryllium 
Lead 
Combustion; 
gross rupture of container; 
Fire; lass of coolant 
Melting and vaporization; 
volatilization 
Fire; reactions between the 
liquid and steam, water, concrete 
Vaporization 
Volatilization 
Vaporization 
Sodium (in an inter- Fire; sodium/concrete reaction; 
mediate coolant cycle) sodium/steam reaction 
+--------------------------------+------------------------------------+ 
Another method for categorization of accidents is the mechanism for 
activating the source of a hazard. One way is an attempt to classify 
accidents into two broad categories, (1) generic and (2) systems 
dependent. By "generic" it is meant that the accident is applicable to 
a wide range of designs. For example, a loss-of-coolant accident 
appears to b'e a generic accident, i. e., all designs have a coolant 
which could be conceivably lost. 
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Same of the generic hazard release mechanisms are: 
1. Related to the D-T fusion reaction: 
a. plasma confinement instabilities (Tokamaks), 
b. localized plasma-wall reactions (Tokamaks), 
c. over-efficient micro explosions (HIBALL), 
d. overpower transients, power oscillations, time incoherences. 
2. Related to components (Blanket, coolant system): 
a. lass of coolant, 
b. lass of coolant flow, 
c. afterheat removal failure, 
d. coolant fires and reaction with concrete, 
e. steam generator or secondary system failure. 
3. Tritium fire or escape. 
Another possibility to classify the accidents is given below. It is 
obvious that the various classifications overlap each other while 
emphasizing one particular aspect each. 
1. Site-related accidents (earthquake, flood, tornado), 
2. Missile Generation (external and internal), 
3. Component failure (pumps, magnets), 
4. Chemical reactions, 
5. System over-pressurization, 
6. Over-heating of the coolant system or pressurized containers, 
7. Lass of off-site power, 
8. Accidents in electrical systems (e.g., oil fire in a capacitor 
bank). 
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM ACCIDENTS 
The total thermal power generated by HIBALL is 10233 MW to be produced 
in four reactor chambers. The coolant (Pb83Li 17 ) will be operated in a 
temperature range from 330° (inlet) to 500° (outlet). The pressure in 
the blanket (i.e. in the SiC-tubes of the so-called INPORT units) is 
low since the coolant is essentially falling under gravity through the 
woven SiC tubes. As the reference design provides only very scarce 
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information about the coolant system layout outside of the reactor 
cavity, we assume that the bulk of the coolant system is similar to 
the coolant systems of an LMFBR of similar size. In many respects, in 
particular regarding building design and rnajor areas outside the reac-
tor cavity and the primary cooling systern, conventional fission reac-
tor safety technology and safety standards will apply. 
A preliminary investigation of the coolant system failures can concen-
trate on events which will be produced in the reactor chamber by such 
failures as: 
0 loss of coolant, 
0 loss of coolant flow, 
0 pressure pulses, 
0 coolant flow blockages, 
0 leaks and ruptures. 
In the subsequent discussion we will disregard any active safety meas-
ures which would be installad to rnonitor the proper operation of the 
plant and initiate corrective actions (shut-down, ernergency cooling) 
whenever the range of safe operation were exceeded. Credit will be 
taken frorn inherent rnechanisrns only. 
LOSS OF COOLANT 
In the event of total and instantaneous loss of coolant frorn a 
reactor, the evaporation-condensation heat transfer rnechanisrn, which 
both protects the SiC-tubes frorn excessive heat loads and provides 
heat removal frorn the cavity, would becorne inoperable. The liquid 
Pb83Li 17 would no langer protect the steel wall and shield frorn the 
radiation and energy release frorn the target. Further analysis of the 
thermal response and failure rnechanisrns of the SiC-tubes in the reac-
tor cavity and of the power increase in the other parts will be 
necessary. 
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW 
Lass of coolant flow through the blanket would cause the energy being 
dumped into the coolant to produce a rapid ternperature increase. Two 
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effects have to be considered: 
o subsequent loss of coolant from the blanket due to vaporization, 
o build-up of a Pb83Li 17 vapor atrnosphere in the cavity due to the 
lack of recondensation capability on the blanket tubes. 
Whether this latter effect would soon enough and effectively inhibit 
the ion bearns to reach the target and thus shut down the reactor, has 
to be investigated. 
PRESSURE PULSES 
Another question in this context is whether the evaporation of the 
coolant would give rise to pressure pulses of sufficient rnagnitude to 
affect the rnechanical integrity of the coolant systern. 
Other potential sources of pressure pulses are: 
o shock waves produced by closure of isolation valves, 
o liquid-metal coolantjwater interaction in the stearn generator, 
o liquid-rnetal coolantjwater interaction in the reactor chamber. 
The first two causes can be elirninated with a coolant system design 
similar to LMFBR standards, that is: elirnination of isolation valves 
in the coolant systern and use of an intermediate coolant loop (the 
double wall stearn generator proposed for HIBALL rnay provide a similar 
degree of reliability). 
COOLANT FLOW BLOCKAGES 
Coolant flow blockages are a point of concern. Partial blockages 
would cause the operating temperatures to be exceeded and possibly 
two-phase flow to be generated. The stability of such a flow needs 
rnore investigation. Total blockages would cause local vaporization, 
subsequent burn-out and likely failure of the corresponding INPORT 
unit. Monitaring the coolant flow (outlet ternperature) of each coolant 
flow path individually is strongly recommended. 
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LEAKS AND RUFTURES 
In the discussion of coolant system ruptures, we must distinguish 
between those leaks which cause loss of liquid from the coolant 
system, and others which cause undesired by-passes but without inte-
gral loss of material from the system. Leaks out of the system pres-
ent a potential activity realease mechanism and may cause coolant 
freezing in areas where it may have considerable effect on later 
repair operations. For preventing and monitaring such leaks, the same 
techniques as in LMFBRs apply, up to and including double wall design 
in inaccessible areas. 
Leaks within the coolant system do not immediately present a potential 
for activity release. However, they cause the coolant flow to concen-
trate in areas wheres it is not expected, and cause reduction of cool-
ing capability in areas where such reduction may lead to damage. An 
example of this type of leak is the failure of an INPORT unit inside 
the reactor cavity. Significant difficulties in detecting such fail-
ures are envisaged. As a precaution, monitaring the outlet temperature 
(if not the flow rate itself) of each INPORT tube individually will 
have to be considered. 
FAlLURE OF THE FUELING SYSTEM 
Failure of the fueling system to deliver the target into the center of 
the cavity on time have two major safety aspects: 
1. shine-through of the ion beams, 
2. pellet impact on the opposite first wall. 
The first aspect will be discussed in the next chapter. The second 
aspect indicates an advantage of the HIBALL-type design (with vertical 
pellet injection) over a design which would inject the pellet horizon-
tally: the pellet would be dumped into the pool on the bottom of the 
cavity and would be absorbed there. 
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BEAM POINTING OR TARGET DELIVERY FAlLURES 
In magnetic confinement fusion reactors, the penetration of neutral 
beams (used for heating) through the plasma is an area of major con-
cern. A similar situation would arise if an ion beam in HIBALL would 
hit the opposite wall instead of the target. According to recent new 
evaluations of the final focussing system for the ion beams, the beams 
have 20 cm radius at 8 m from the cavity center. Assuming that the 
convergence and divergence of the beam occurs symmetrically along the 
path through the cavity, the beam - unless stopped by the target -
would illuminate a circular spot of 12.5 cm radius at the first wall 
surface. The average energy density in this hot spot is 5.1 MJ/m2 per 
shot for a beam energy of 0.25 MJ. At normal operation, the energy 
deposition at the first wall surface (assuming 87 MJ of X-ray energy 
according to Fig. VI.4-2 in (2]) is 0.28 MJ/m2 per shot. Hence, the 
non-absorbed ion beam produces a load that is at least 18 times higher 
than during normal operation. 
According to (2, page 144], a target micro-explosion causes the evapo-
ration of approximately 4 ~m from the liquid first wall surface. Thus, 
provided that the surface can be rewetted sufficiently will within the 
time period of 0.2 seconds, the energy sink capability appears to be 
adequate for the full ion beam load. However, the structural response 
caused by the thrust of the evaporated layer will require more 
detailed considerations. 
Alternative design 
shine-through areas: 
solutions may be considered for the beam 
1. Symmetrical layout of the beam entrances such that they face each 
other pairwise. 
In this case, the ion beam would penetrate backwards into the 
opposite beam line. This may provide a method to dump the energy 
over larger areas. However, it would likely complicate the design 
of the beam lines as well as their control system. 
2. Provision of special beam dumps. 
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By tilting the surface with respect to the centerline of the beam, 
the geometry can provide significant reduction of the beam inten-
sity. This technique is commonly used for dumping the power of 
high energy beams. However, for the extreme heat loads envisaged 
here, this approach will not provide sufficient benefits over its 
disadvantage effects 
geometry. 
of disturbing the overall first wall 
In the above estimates, no credit was taken from the fact that the 
high concentration of ions in the cavity center (in particular if all 
beams meet simultaneously) will likely cause the beams to diverge due 
to space charge effects. This aspect needs further investigation. 
A separate issue is the behaviour of a target which is only partially 
and unsymmetrically illuminated by ion beams. The unsymmetrical 
reaction would cause the target to become a missile which has to be 
considered as a potential loading for the first wall and the roof. 
The bottarn is inherently protected by the coolant pool. 
CRYOGENIC SYSTEM FAlLURES 
Failures of the cryogenic system have to be considered with respect to 
the following potential consequences: 
1. Failure of cooling of the superconducting magnets with subsequent 
release of the magnetic energy resulting in mechanical forces able 
to perform destructive work. This chain of events is much less 
severe in HIBALL than in an INTOR-type reactor, e.g., because 
HIBALL has much smaller superconducting coils. 
2. Evaporation of the cryogenic liquids (He and N2 ) leading to pres-
sure build-up in the containment building. Again, this problern is 
less severe than in a TOKAMAK reactor of similar size because of 
the smaller amounts of cryogenic fluids available. 
3. Subcooling of structural components inducing thermal stress while 
at the same time causing embrittlement of the material. Such 
sequences of events would have to be studied in more detail in 
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later design stages, but no fundamental difficulties in dealing 
with this problern are envisaged. 
4. Explosive vaporization of cryogenic liquid upon contact with a 
hotter fluid like water or lead-lithium. Here again, more design 
details are required to analyze this possibility properly on the 
basis of plausible mechanisms for such an event. Also for TOKAMAK 
type reactors, this possibility should be investigated more inten-
sively. 
HYDROGEN FIRES 
As discussed already in 
tritium" on page 19 and 
"Chemical Energy Available in deuterium and 
shown by Table 4 most of the deuterium and 
tritium will be stored in the target fabrication area. Leaks in stor-
age facilities and pressurized containers could lead to air-deuterium 
or air-tritium mixtures having the potential of explosions if hydrogen 
concentrations above 4.1% are attained. Application of inert gas 
atmospheres will decrease the potential of explosions somewhat by 
increasing the lower limit for the critical concentration. More effec-
tive means will be double containment for pressurized containers and 
storage facilities as well as the application of hydrogen recombina-
tion devices in areas where leaks might develop. 
EVENTS EXTERNAL TO THE FACILITY 
Events external to the facility fall into three categories: 
1. natural disasters (earth-quakes, strong winds and floods), 
2. aircraft crashes, 
3. gas cloud explosions and 
4. events caused by intentional human intervention. 
The first category has been briefly discussed in "Natural Disasters" 
on page 23. All these events, however, do not present any particular 
problern for an inertial confinement fusion reactor which is qualita-
tively different from the case of 
tor or an LMFBR. It would be 
a magnetic confinement fusion reac-
much too early to undertake a 
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quantitative risk assessment. In such a later assessment, two aspect 
would have to be considered in more detail: 
1. the effect of combining the power plant tagether with the reproc-
essing and fuel pellet manufacturing plant on one site, and 
2. the large area of the site (about 2 by 2 km, with an appendix of 
about 3 km by 500 m for the linear accelerator) which makes it 
more susceptible to any kind of external event. 
INCIDENTS DURING MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS 
A preliminary investigation of fusion power plants (both with magnetic 
confinement and inertial confinement) has indicated that maintenance 
operations play a dominant role. They are perhaps more liable for 
activity release than the periods of power production. This is due to 
the inherent fact that many and sometimes large activated and contam-
inated structural components have to be handled (inspected, dis-
assembled, transported, repaired, reassembled) remotely. However, 
because of the complexity of these operations and the lacking experi-
ence with them, it is much too early to give a quantitative assessment 
of their influence upon the activity release potential. Instead, it 
appears to be a safety requirement for the design of all maintenance 
operations that their contribution to the activity release should not 
be greater than if the plant were producing power during the shut-down 
time instead of being maintained. This criterion should include inci-
dents like dropping a piece of equipment, imperfect closure of 
containment vaults or failure of welding or cutting machinery. 
HUMAN ERRORS 
Human errors have to be considered as potential origins for sequences 
of events which may finally lead to activity re.lease. Human errors may 
also be of concern with respect to safety if a person's reaction is 
part of the whole set of countermeasures against a technically origi-
nated incident. 
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During normal operation (that is: during power production) we can 
expect that the well established standards of fission reactor safety 
technology will also apply for fusion reactors, e.g.: 
o the plant will be guarded against potentially hazardous human 
actions by appropriate active and passive safety measures, 
o no human intervention is required within 30 minutes after a poten-
tially hazardous incident to ensure plant safety. 
Much more consideration will have to be given to human errors and 
their potential consequences during maintenance. However, the mainte-
nance operations will have to be defined in considerable detail before 
such an analysis can produce useful results. 
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS 
TRITIUM RELEASE DURING NORMAL OPERATION 
With a given release rate as estimated in Table 3 the exposure dose 
rate due to normal operation can be calculated for a given distance 
from the reactor plant. Assumptions must be made for the exhaust stack 
height, the atmospheric dispersion of the radioactivity and the popu-
lation density areund the plant. On the basis of a 100 or 200 m high 
stack for tritium release, metereo1ogical conditions as measured at 
Hannover, FRG, and a population density of 250 persons/km2 the result-
ing exposure dose rates were calculated following the national German 
guide-lines GMBI-21 [19]. Figure 5 shows the local effective commit-
ted exposure due to gaseous and liquid effluents. It also compares 
the exposure doses on a 1 GW a basis for a pressurized water reactor 
e 
(PWR) and the respective reprocessing plant with a HIBALL-type plant. 
The higher stack of 200 m of the latter strongly influences the com-
mitted local exposures in the direct vicinity of the plant. Whereas 
the HIBALL reactor plant will release only tritium, additional radio-
active nuclides, e.g., radioactive noble gases (krypton, xenon) and ß-
or a-emitting aerosols (fission products and actinides) must be 
accounted for in the case of the PWR and its reprocessing plant [20, 
- 35 -
21]. All exposure dose data decrease strongly with distance from the 
plant and are in the range of 0.1 vSv/(GW a) or 0.01 mrem/(GW a) at a 
e e 
distance of 10 km from the plant. This is well below the present lim-
its imposed by radiation protection ordinances. 
For a 5 GW HIBALL-type plant in which 5 reactors of 1 GW each wou1d 
e e 
be driven by one linear accelerator at a plant load factor of 0.7, the 
dose rates would be very close to those of the PWR reprocessing plant 
scaled to 1 GW . In making such comparisons, however, it should be 
e 
recalled that the results for a PWR and its respective reprocessing 
plant are based on realistic (measured) data whereas the estimates for 
a HIF plant depend upon the assumptions made for the diffusion barri-
ers in the steam generator tubes and other permeation rates of tritium 
in different parts of the plant. 
A comparison of tritium releases from fission reactors and their fuel 
cycle shows that, under the present assumptions, reprocessing plants 
and heavy-water reactors would have similar releases per GW a as ICF 
e 
or MCF reactor design concepts (Table 7). Again it must be emphasized 
that the releases of tritium from fusion reactor plants are only pre-
liminary estimates which may give an indication for confinement 
measures to be designed into such future plants. In this sense the 
difference in release rates between HIBALL and STARFIRE stems only 
from differences in assumptions. 
ACCIDENTAL RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVITY 
Licensing regulations will require the consequence analysis of radio-
activity releases from the reactor plant to the environment. This 
analysis would have to be performed following through all possible 
accident sequences which can lead to major radioactivity releases from 
the plant. As an example, two such accident sequences are briefly 
described. 
o As a consequence of an earthquake a stress induced leak in one or 
several beam channels close to the reactor could develop. Air 
could flow into the cavity and through chemical reaction of oxygen 
1 
0 
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Figure 5. Camparisan of committed exposures: The local effective 
committed exposure due to gaseaus and liquid effluents 
of HIBALL is compared with a PWR and a PWR reprocessing 
plant. 
with Pb83Li17 
The cryopumps 
a certain 
may be 
amount of 
heated up 
aerosols would 
and release 
be generated. 
their tritium 
inventory. Both lead-lithium oxide aerosols and tritium would flow 
into the outer containment of the reactor or directly into the 
environment, depending upon where the leak develops. 
o Lass of cryogenic heat sinks in the target manufacturing and stor-
age facility may occur as a consequence of fire which also may 
darnage the containment, Tritium may be released and penetrate 
through leaks to the environment. 
These are only two examples of accident sequences possibly leading to 
major releases of tritium and radioactive aerosols. As a detailed fol-
" > (J)
::t 
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TABLE 7: TRITIUM RELEASE RATES FROM FISSION 
AND FUSION REACTOR PLANTS 
+----------------------+-----------+----------+ 
Gaseous Liquid 
Ci/(GW a)l Ci/(GW a)l 
e e 
+----------------------+----------+-----------+ 
Pressurized Light 45 400 
Water Reactor (PWR) 
Reprocessing for PWR 1100 3300 
Heavy Water 15000 7500 
Reactor (ID.rR) 
HIBALL (ICF) 5800 1500 
STARFIRE 3200 800 
(Tokamak) 
+----------------------+-----------+----------+ 
low-up of a whole spectrum of accidents is not possible at the present 
stage of conceptual plant design, we consider a single typical 
instead. We assume that 0.5 kg tritium (5*106 Ci) plus 1% of the 
case 
coo-
lant activity (see Table 7) would be suddenly released during an unde-
fined severe accident. This puff release is assumed to occur from one 
of the 1 GW power reactor units of a multiple-unit HIF reactor plant. 
e 
This assumption is not based on a deterministic analysis but rather 
represents a postulated conservative upper bound source term for 
radioactivity entering the environment. Nore realistic analysis may 
lead to substantially lower releases. 
EXPOSURE DOSES FROM ACCIDENTAL RELEASES 
The cumulative radiation dose from a puff release of radioactivity 
some person receives at a certain dist~~ce from the reactor plant 
depends on the release height and on the meteorological conditions, 
e.g., wind speed, wind direction and atmospheric dispersion rate. 
Cumulative doses were calculated for the above activity released at a 
height of 100m in two different weather situations. The exposure 
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pathways considered were external exposure from the plume, external 
exposure from the ground, internal exposure via inhalation and inter-
nal exposure via ingestion of agricultural products harvested and con-
sumed immediately after the accident. For dispersion category C 
(slightly unstable atmospheric conditions, v = 3 m/s at H = 10 m, no 
rain) the maximum dose is received at a distance of 500 rn downwind 
from the exhaust stack and arnounts to 105 rnSv or 10.5 rem. For disper-
sion category F (inversion, v = 2 rn/s at H = 10 m, no rain) the 
rnaximurn is found 8 km frorn the plant and arnounts to 2.1 rnSv or 0.21 
rern. 
Calculations for a 0.5 kg tritiurn release were also rnade assurning zero 
release height, i.e. direct leakage from a building. In this case, the 
maximum dose is received very close to the plant. The dose at a dis-
tance of 1 km is 360 mSv or 36 rern in inversion-type weather but only 
40 rnSv or 4 rern with a slightly unstable atrnosphere. 
It can be concluded that for these releases the exposure would remain 
below 250 rnSv (25 rem) at a distance of 2 km from the plant even in 
unfavorable weather conditions. A 2 km exclusion area boundary is 
roughly consistent with the extension of a cornplete HIBALL power plant 
including the driver. The assumed releases thus stay below the 25 rern 
dose limit of U.S. federal regulations 10 CFR 100 and below the TFTR 
dose criterion for an accident with a probability of occurrence of 
10- 7 per year which is also defined as 25 rern at the plant exclusion 
area boundary. 
SITING ASPECTS 
With respect to the site selection, a HIBALL type power plant has sirn-
ilar requirements as any other nuclear power plant of the sarne power 
level.In particular, the safety requirernents for the site appear tobe 
the same. Only with respect to the needed area of land a remarkable 
difference can be noticed: the additional area requirernent for the 
driver systern (especially for the linear accelerator several km lang). 
- 39 -
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation for the support 
which they received from Dr. von Möllendorff, Institut für Neutonen-
physik und Reaktortechnik, in discussions and during the final prepa-
rations of this manuscript. 
REFERENCES 
[1] B. Badger et al.: HIBALL - A Conceptual Heavy Ion Beam Driven 
Fusion Reactor Study. Valurne 1. KfK 3202/1, UWFDM-450, Kernfor-
schungszentrum Karlsruhe (1981). 
[2] B. Badger et al.: HIBALL - A Conceptual Heavy Ion Beam Driven 
Fusion Reactor Study. Valurne 2. KfK 3202/2, UWFDM-450, Kernfor-
schungszentrum Karlsruhe (1981). 
[3] -: International Tokamak Reactor (INTOR): Phase One. IAEA, Vien-
na, 1982. STI/PUB/619; ISBN 92-0-131082-X. Karlsruhe (1981). 
[4] R.L. Woerner, H. Rieger: Fabrication and characterization of 
cryogenic targets for inertial-confinement fusion. University of 
California Report UCRL-15113 (1980). 
[5] G.L. Kulcinski et al.: The INPORT Concept - An improved method to 
protect ICF reactor first walls. UWFDM-426, August 1981. 
[6] B. Badger et al.: HIBALL-II, An Improved Conceptual Heavy Ion 
Beam Driven Fusion Reactor Study. KfK 3840, Kernforschungszentrum 
Karlsruhe, to appear. 
[7] H. Runge: Tritium-Bilanz und Verträglichkeit von SiC mit Li 17Pb 83 
für das Fusionsreaktorsystem HIBALL. Report INTAT 55.06775.6. 
Interatom, Bergisch-Gladbach (Februar 1984). 
(8] M.E. Sawan, W.F. Vogelsang and D.K. Sze: Trans. Am. Soc. 39 
(1981) 777. 
(9] T.A. Renner, D.J. Rave: Tritium permeation through 
Fe-2 1/4 Cr-1 Mo steam generator material. Nuclear Technology 4 
(1979) 312-319. 
[10] J.T. Bellet al.: Tritium permeability of structural materials 
and surface effects on permeation rates. Proc. on Tritium Tech-
- 40 -
nology in Fission, Fusion and Isotopic Applications, ANS Topical 
Meeting, US-DOE Report CONF-800427 (1980) 48-53. 
[11) J.L. Anderson, R.H. Sherman: Tritium systems Test Assembly. 
LA-6855-P (1977). 
[12] S. Dorner, G. Schumacher: Personal communication (1984). 
[13) L. Muhlesteinet a1.: Summary of HEDL fusion reactor safety sup-
port studies. HEDL-SA-2360ß (1984). 
[14] G. Kessler: Nuclear Fission Reactors. Springer-Verlag, Wien 
(1983). 
[15] W. Häfele et al.: Fusion and Fast Breeder Reactors. Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg Austria, 
RR-77-8 (1977). 
[16) W. Braun et al.: The reactor containment of German PWR's of stan-
dard design. Int. Conf. on Containment Design, June 17-20, 1984, 
Toronto, Ontario. 
[17] F. Arendt, P. Komarek: Potential failures and hazards in super-
conducting magnet systems for fusion reactors. Nuclear 
Technology/Fusion, Val. 1 (October 1981) 552. 
[18) W. E. Kastenberg, D. Okrent: Same Safety Considerations for Con-
ceptual Tokamak Fusion Power Reactors. Report ER-546, Research 
Project 236-1. Univ. of California, Los Angeles (July 1978). 
[19) Bundesministerium des Inneren, Bundesrepublik Deutschland: All-
gemeine Berechnungsgrundlage für die Strahlenexposition bei 
radioaktiven Ableitungen mit der Abluft oder in 
Oberflächengewässer. Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt 21 (August 
1979) 369-436. 
[20) G. Halbritter, E. Lessmann: Vergleich der Strahlenexposition aus 
Emissionen von Modell-Brennstoffkreisläufen für den Druckwasser-
reaktor und den Schnellen Brutreaktor. Kernforschungszentrum 
Karlsruhe, Report KfK 3315 (1982). 
[21] E. Lessmann: Personal communication (1983). 
[22] A. Bayer: Personal communication (1983). 
